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We investigate the effect of a local territorial reform, which reduced the number of parishes, on 
municipality spending efficiency in the period 2011-2016. We build a composite output indicator 
and use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute efficiency scores, which we then analyze 
through a second stage regression with socio-demographic, economic factors and the reform. We 
find efficiency gains for around 10% of municipalities overall. In Alentejo and in Centro, more 
than 50% of the municipalities improved efficiency. The second stage results show that the reform 
did not improve local spending efficiency in Mainland Portugal, particularly in the Norte region. 
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Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public services and at same time reducing public 
spending has become an important concern in the public sector. Undoubtedly, local governments 
could benefit from adhering to these objectives. Decentralization has transferred to the local 
government a considerable amount of government spending and decision-making. Yet, the 
resources to fulfill the demand for more and better local public services are scarce. Therefore, 
reforms that reduce local public spending and improve efficiency are very relevant.  Most reforms 
have focused on two main areas: merging administrative regions or decentralizing the 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities.  In this study, we will focus on the first type of reform.  
Previous studies have evaluated the optimal size of municipalities (Doumpos and Cohen, 
2014) and assessed the effect size, in terms of population, on municipality efficiency. Most studies 
find that efficiency scores are higher for larger municipalities (Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-
Ausina, 2007; Doumpos and Cohen, 2014) because of increasing economies of scale.  Indeed, there 
is reasonable agreement that the smaller municipalities have higher costs (or compromised service 
quality) for all public services. For example, research of small local governments in Swiss Cantons 
suggests that costs and quality are severely compromised below a population of 500 (Ladner et al. 
2003).  
This paper contributes to this literature by assessing the changes on municipal efficiency 
stemming from a structural reform that reduced the number of administrative and local government 
units. Our example took place in 2013 when Portugal decreased (by around 29%) the number of 
parishes. Portugal provides an excellent case study to analyze the impact of this reform on 
municipality efficiency for three reasons. First, between 2011 and 2016, a municipality in Portugal 
spent on average 26 million Euros and municipality transfers to parishes accounted for 




administrative autonomy, they rely heavily on funds from central government. On average, 
transferences from central government accounted for 42 percent of the total revenues. With this 
reform, the government intended to reduce the municipality spending and the amount of transfers 
to parishes, together with the assumption of fostering scale economies. Second, municipalities have 
to comply with the same rules and legislation but local politicians have some discretionary power 
on how to implement their policies and to use their resources. Finally, the local territory reform 
resulted from the memorandum of understanding signed between the Portuguese government, the 
EU and with the International Monetary Fund. Therefore, the need to reduce public expenditure in 
the local government made measuring their efficiency even more pressuring.  
Hence, this study uses a two-stage methodology to measure the impact of the reform on the 
municipality efficiency. In the first stage, efficiency scores are measured using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) for the years 2011 (before the reform) and 2016 (after the reform). To compute 
the DEA efficiency scores, we use a composite indicator of municipal services’ provisions 
(outputs), as in Afonso and Venâncio (2016), and we use local government spending as the input.  
A second stage is proposed where the effect of the reform on the change of the efficiency scores 
obtained from the first stage is evaluated. We test our approach for the case of Portugal, both for 
the mainland and for the European Union Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 
regions. 
Our results show that: i) between 2011 and 2016 there were efficiency gains for a small 
percentage of the municipalities, 10% and 6% respectively for the input and for the output oriented 
efficiency scores; ii) regionally, notably in Alentejo and in Centro, more than 50% of the 
municipalities improved efficiency; iii) the efficiency gains were negatively related to the territorial 





The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 
3 reviews the Portuguese local government sector and Sector 4 presents the methodology. Section 
5 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Public finance theory argues that fiscal decentralization can increase the efficiency in the 
allocation of (public) resources. In other words, lower tiers of governments are closer to citizens 
and might provide informational advantages regarding their preferences (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2009). However, sometimes sub-national governments may not be able to make optimal 
resource allocation, since the central government usually commands more sophisticated technical 
resources. Therefore, the measurement of public sector efficiency and its determinants has been 
the subject of a growing literature.  
Generally, this literature assesses technical efficiency (a concept stemming from Farrell, 
1957) by using frontier analysis. Therefore, and to assess the efficiency of government spending, 
many studies usually estimate non-parametrically a production function frontier and derive 
efficiency scores based on the relative distances of inefficient observations from the frontier.1 
Efficiency is measured in an input-output perspective, in which the services provided (outputs) by 
the local or the central government are assessed against the resources employed (inputs). Formally, 
the higher the ratio of outputs to inputs, the more efficient the local or the central government is. 
Previous studies have used frontier techniques (data envelopment analysis, free disposal 
hull, stochastic frontier analysis) to analyze the cost efficiency of public sector in different 
                                                           
1 There are several parametric and non-parametric methodologies to compute technical efficiency. Parametric 
approaches include corrected ordinary least squares and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Among the non-parametric 




countries or in a cross-country setup. The related literature follows broadly two streams: studies 
that evaluate the overall efficiency of the services provided by the (local) government, and studies 
that focus on a particular (municipal) public service. 
Afonso et al. (2005, 2010) studied the overall public sector efficiency across several OCDE 
countries, taking into account the level of general government spending. On the other hand, several 
specific government functions such as education and health have been addressed by Afonso and 
St. Aubyn (2006, 2011). St. Aubyn et al. (2009) studied the case of Universities in the European 
Union. Overall, those studies show the existence of room for improvement regarding public 
spending efficiency. Although cross-country aggregated efficiency studies are very useful to 
compare the performance of different countries, efficiency analyses of individual countries take 
into account the institutional, cultural, political and economic setting providing more insights for 
the policy makers (Mandl, Dierx and Ilzkovitz, 2008).  
Conversely, public spending efficiency studies covering the aggregated performance of local 
governments have been done for several countries. For instance, Van den Eeckaut, Tulkens and 
Jamar (1993), De Borger et al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996, 2000) for Belgium; 
Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) and Doumpos and Cohen (2014) for Greece; Worthington 
(2000) for Australia; Prieto and Zofio (2001), Balaguer-Coll, Prior-Jiménez and Vela-Bargues 
(2002) and Benito, Bastida and Garcia (2010) for Spain; Afonso and Scaglioni (2007) and Storto 
(2015) for Italy; Waldo (2001) for Sweden; and Sampaio and Stosic (2005) for Brazil. In Portugal, 
we highlight the studies of Afonso and Fernandes (2006, 2008), Cruz and Marques (2014) and 
Afonso and Venâncio (2016).2 Other stream of research includes studies that evaluate the efficiency 
of a specific municipality service, such as Bouckaert (1992) for the fire service; Lozano, Villa and 
                                                           




Adenso-Dias (2004) for recycling operations and Rogge and De Jaeger (2013) for solid waste 
collection. Once again, the results of these two strands of the literature point to the fact that 
governments can attain efficiency gains at the municipal level as well.  
Finally, research efforts have been also devoted to understand the major determinants of local 
government efficiency. Particularly, researchers have investigated the impact on municipality 
efficiency of a number of socio-demographic and economic characteristics, financial resources, 
environmental issues not controlled by the decision-makers, economies of scale and scope.  
Our study aims to contribute to the local public spending literature by evaluating a specific 
reform, which merged several parishes in the belief that the aggregation of smaller administration 
entities would reduce public expenditure, and improve efficiency because of increasing economies 
of scale (Fox & Gurley, 2006; Warner, 2012). There are several examples where the pooling of 
resources, notably for water supply, sewage provision, primary education, increase efficiency 
notably by cost reduction. Interestingly, such pooling of resources could be dependent on the 
percentage of parishes, within a municipality. 
 
3. Portuguese local government sector 
To better frame the empirical results, we review some stylized facts about the Portuguese 
local government sector and the 2013 territorial organizational reform.  
According to the Portuguese Constitution, local administration includes administrative 
regions, municipalities and civil parishes.3 As the administrative regions have not yet been 
                                                           
3 Portugal’s administrative regions are organized into three tiers: districts and two autonomous regions of Azores and 
Madeira, municipalities and civil parishes. For statistical purposes, the European Union (EU) redefined the Portuguese 
territory into Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) regions. The NUTS system subdivides the 
country into three levels: NUTS I (Portugal mainland and 2 autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira), NUTS II (7 
regions) and NUTS III (30 sub-regions). These latter classifications were developed for the purpose of delivering 




established, the authorities responsible for delivering local public services are municipalities and 
parishes. At the end of 2012, there were 308 municipalities subdivided into 4,260 parishes. Of the 
total, 278 municipalities and 4,050 sections of municipalities, parishes, were located in mainland 
Portugal and the remaining 30 municipalities and 210 parishes were located in Azores and Madeira 
islands. In this study, we will focus on mainland municipalities and parishes because the islands 
have a different institutional and economic context.  
The mainland municipalities are very heterogeneous in terms of population, geographical 
size, purchasing power and support received from the central government. Table 1 presents the 
socio-demographic, economic and political characteristics of the municipalities for the year 2011. 
[Table 1] 
The size of municipalities varies considerably. The median was 15,700 inhabitants, and the 
mean was 36,143 inhabitants. Almost 45 percent of the population lives in 23 municipalities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants (8 percent of all municipalities). In terms of population density, the 
average and median was 311 and 70 inhabitants per squared kilometers, respectively. 
Municipalities are also economically different. There are a few very rich municipalities. In fact, 
only 34 municipalities have a purchase power higher than 100. 
Local governments are territorially based organizations with administrative and fiscal 
autonomy. They have their own employees, patrimony and fiscal independence and its activity 
satisfies the local needs of their citizens. While municipalities have a major role on delivering local 
public services to citizens, parish competences are limited to a few public services (e.g. road and 
park maintenance; social facilities for children and the elderly and residence permits). Nonetheless, 




provide a plethora of traditional local government services:4 development and maintenance of local 
infrastructures (e.g. sport, leisure and basic school facilities), supply of public goods such as 
drinking water, waste and sewage collection, education, childcare support, urban transportation, 
urban planning, health services, housing, cultural activities and events, and civil protection.5 To 
provide these local public services, municipalities can freely choose their governance structures 
(direct, indirect, public, private or mix). In terms of revenues, municipalities are funded with 
transfers from the central government, transfers from the European Union, local taxes and sales 
and other revenues. Nonetheless, transferences from central government account, on average, for 
42 percent of the total revenues. Municipalities obtain 46 percent of their revenues by self-
generated revenues and taxes account on average for 39 percent of their own revenuers. Note that 
municipalities cannot set their own taxes and, the rates have to be defined within a range defined 
centrally.6 Under the local finances legal framework, municipalities have their own budgets, and 
are subject to restrictive expenditure control mechanisms. They have to comply with strict budget 
rules and debt limits. Hence, their financial autonomy is rather limited in terms of revenues and 
borrowing.  
In 2011, due to the sovereign debt crisis, Portugal applied for a bailout program with the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission.  The 
memorandum of understanding signed in May 2011 entailed several clauses concerning the local 
government, namely: increase decentralization, reduce transfers from the central government, 
                                                           
4 Some essential services are provided by the central government or private sector.  Education is a competence of the 
central governement. Electricity, natural gas, postal services, broadband and telecomincations are provided by private 
companies. 
5 See Law 159/99 and Law 2/2007. 
6 The central government sets the tax base of all the local taxes, and the tax rate on transfers of real estate (IMT –
Imposto Municipal sobre as Transmissões Onerosas de Imóveis). In the remaining local taxes, the municipalities set 
the tax rates within a range defined at the national level.  For municipal corporate income tax (Derrama) and personal 
income tax, municipalities cannot charge more than the maximum threshold, and  for property tax (IMI – Imposto 




enhance reporting on budget execution and improve efficiency of local administration. In 
September 2011, the Green Paper on the reform of the local administration was published and it 
set the following goals: accomplish effective decentralization of local services, rationalize local 
government structures, envisage higher proximity and efficiency of local public services and 
reduce the number of parishes.  This reform intended to create efficiencies and reduce public 
spending. At the same time, it affected the territorial geography and the political management of 
municipalities and parishes. These changes were implemented before the local government 
elections of 2013. Besides reducing the number of representatives in the local boards, the reform 
also increased, reduced or merged various parishes within municipalities, changed the territorial 
limits of the parishes within municipalities, and transferred parishes from one municipality to 
another.7 Table A.1 of Appendix A presents the type of changes that occurred on each municipality. 
In addition, it is possible to observe that between 2009 and 2012, the number of parishes was 4,050. 
After 2013, the number of parishes reduced to 2,882, corresponding to a decrease of 29%. Of the 
total number of parishes, 50% merged with other parishes within the municipality (2022 parishes), 
49% did not experience any change and the remaining 1% had their territorial limits changed.  
Before 2013, a municipality included on average 15 parishes (see Table 2). Barcelos was the 
municipality with the most parishes (89 before 2013 and 61 after 2013). Four municipalities, 
Alpiarça, Barrancos, São Brás de Alportel and São João da Madeira, included a single parish. After 
2013, Castanheira de Pera was also included to the list of municipalities with just one parish. 
[Table 2] 
                                                           
7 There were two transferences of parishes between municipalities. Pombalinho parish moved from Santarém 
municipality to Golegã municipaliy. Parque das Nações parish was created including parts of the Loures municipality 




As a complementary exercise, we report in Table 3 the determinants that have contributed to 
the adoption of the reform. The dependent variable is a binary variable that assumes one for the 
municipalities that reduced the number of parishes and zero otherwise. The variable definition and 
sources in Appendix Table B.1. Interestingly, the likelihood of implementing the reform and 
reduced the number of parishes increases notably with the size of the municipality (population) and 
the level of per capita spending, and decreases with the level of purchasing power. The reform 
targeted less rich municipalities and those with larger transfers to parishes. In terms of political 
variables, municipalities whose mayor was from the same political party as the central government 




 DEA is a non-parametric frontier methodology, which draws from Farrell’s (1957) 
seminal work and was further developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). Non-parametric 
techniques do not require the definition of the production functions and demand fewer requirements 
from the data. Frontier methodologies compare all observations with the “best practices”. The 
production frontier in the DEA approach uses linear programming methods and computes the 
relative efficiency of a group of Decision Management Units (DMUs) that consume identical inputs 
and produce identical outputs.8 For each municipality i, we consider is the following function: 
 )( ii XfY = , i=1,…,n  (1) 
                                                           




where Yi is the composite output measure for municipality i and Xi is the per capita municipal 
expenditures registered on municipal accounts for the each year (2011 and 2016) as a measure of 
the municipal resources used in local services’ provision input in municipality i.  
If ( )i iY f X< , it is said that municipality i exhibits inefficiency. For the observed input 
levels, the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and inefficiency is measured by 
computing the distance to the theoretical efficiency frontier.  
 Adopting an input orientation, for explanation purposes, and assuming the presence of 
variable-returns to scale (VRS), the efficient scores are computed through the following linear 
programming problem: 9 
, 
s. to   0
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 . (2) 
In this formulation, there are k inputs used to produce m outputs for n DMUs. For the i-th DMU, xi 
is the column vector of the inputs and yi is the column vector of the outputs. We can also define X 
as the (k× n) input matrix and Y as the (m n) output matrix.  
 In (3),  is a scalar (that satisfies 1/  ≤ 1), and specifically is the efficiency score that 
measures technical efficiency, the distance between a municipality and the efficiency frontier, 
defined as a linear combination of the best practice observations. With 1  < 1 , the municipality 
is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while  = 1  implies that the municipality is on the 
frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
                                                           
9 This is the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), using the duality property of the multiplier 





 The vector λ is a (n 1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to compute the 
location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient, and n1 is an n-dimensional vector of 
ones. The inefficient DMU can theoretically be on the production frontier as a linear combination 
of those weights, related to the peers of the inefficient DMU. The peers are other DMUs that are 
more efficient, and used as references for the inefficient DMU. The restriction 1'1 =λn  imposes 
convexity of the frontier, accounting for VRS.  Dropping this restriction would amount to admit 
that returns to scale were constant.  
 Problem (3) is solved for each of the n DMUs in order to obtain the n efficiency scores. 
The VRS scores represent the pure technical efficiencies (PTE) and take into account that fact that 
DMUs might not operate at the optimal scale. In contrast, scores obtained through constant return 
to scale (CRS) represent technical efficiency (TE) and assumes that all DMUs are operating at the 
optimal scale.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Data and variables  
The data sample used in this analysis includes 278 municipalities for two periods: 2011, 
before the reform and 2016, after the reform (see Table 2). Between 2011 and 2016, the Portuguese 
economy was influenced by several economic events, such as the financial bailout, the outbreak of 
the economic crisis that spanned from 2008 until 2014 and the economic recovery from 2014 
onwards.  
To build the DEA efficiency scores for 2011 and 2016, we construct an output composite 
indicator, Local Government Output Indicator (LGOI) as suggested by Afonso and Venâncio 





services, Y1 (local inhabitants above 65 years old as a percentage of resident population); basic 
education Y2 (school buildings per capita measured by the number of nursery and primary school 
buildings in percent of the total number of corresponding school-age inhabitants, Y21; and gross 
primary enrolment ratio, the number of enrolled students in nursery and primary education in 
percent of the total number of corresponding school age inhabitants, Y22); cultural services, Y3 
(number of museums, zoos, botanical gardens and aquariums as a percentage of resident 
population, Y31; and number of art facilities as percentage of resident population, Y32); sanitation, 
Y4 (water supply per resident population, Y41; and urban waste collection per resident population, 
Y42); territorial organization, Y5 (building permits issued by local administration per resident 
population). To obtain the composite output indicator all values of each previous sub-indicator 
were normalised by setting the average equal to one. To compile the indicator from the various 
sub-indicators, we give equal weight to each of them. Our input measure includes municipal 
spending per resident population. Table B.2 in the Appendix B summarizes the definitions of our 
input and output variables and its sources. 
 
5.2. DEA efficiency scores 
Table 4 provides a summary of the DEA results that we have obtained for 2011 and 2016. 
The purpose of an input-oriented assessment is to study by how much one can proportionally 
reduce input quantities without changing the output quantities produced. Alternatively, and by 
computing output-oriented measures, one can assess how much output quantities can be 
proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. In the case of the efficiency 
scores for 2011, we can see from Table 4 that input efficiency scores range between 0.514 for the 
Mainland and 0.674 in Algarve and in the Lisboa and Vale do Tejo (LTV) regions, implying that 




other hand, output efficiency scores range between 0.293 for the Mainland and 0.670 the Norte 
region, which means that one might envisage and output increase of around 37%-71% with the 
same level of inputs.  
[Table 4] 
Turning to the results obtained for 2016, also in Table 4, we find that the input efficiency 
scores range between 0.425 for the Mainland and 0.655 in Alentejo and in the Centro regions, 
implying that inputs could be theoretically lower by around 34%-56%, keeping the same level of 
output. In terms of the output efficiency scores, these range between 0.217 for the Mainland and 
the Alentejo region, and 0.646 for the Algarve region, implying that theoretically output could 
increase around 35%-78% with the same level of inputs.  
Table 5 compares with more detail the changes in the efficiency scores between 2011 and 
2016 for the overall Mainland. One can notice that between 2011 and 2016 there were efficiency 
gains for a small percentage of the municipalities, 10% and 6% respectively for the input and for 
the output oriented efficiency scores. In addition, Table 6 provides a similar exercise per region. In 
this case, the regions where there was a higher percentage of municipalities that increased their 
respective efficiency scores were the Alentejo (input) and Centro (input and output) regions with 




5.3. Explaining efficiency 
Since several exogenous factors are necessarily responsible for the existence of 
inefficiencies, we can then assess how the change of the efficiency scores relates to such 




analysis, and factors proposed in the literature on local government efficiency, namely municipality 
characteristics not controlled by the mayor, changes in municipality characteristics and local 
governments’ discretion behavior. For that purpose, we compare the DEA input efficiency scores 
before and after the reform using the following equation: 
∆	  =  
  +  
∆ℎ	 + 	′
 + 	              (3) 
where i denotes inland municipality. 
Our dependent variable in Equation (3), ∆	, is the difference between the DEA input scores 
before and after reform computed in the previous section.  
Our variable of interest is ∆ℎ	 , defined as the change in the number of parishes within 
a municipality, computed as the difference between the logarithm of the number of parishes after 
and before the reform.  Alternatively, we consider a binary variable 	, which equals one if 
a municipality reduced the number of parishes, and zero otherwise. In these analyzes, we exclude 
one municipality which increased its number of parishes due to the reform. Our results do not 
change when we compute the effect of the reform in all mainland municipalities. 
Local performance may be influenced by municipality characteristics and changes in the 
municipality characteristics. Therefore, we include a vector, 	  to control for changes on 
sociodemographic and economic characteristics of the municipality. First, we include a binary 
variables coastal that equals one for municipality located near the sea and zero otherwise. This 
variable allow us to control for factors not influenced by the mayor namely, the existence of natural 
resources (beaches) and the type of geography of the municipality.   
In addition, we consider the change in size of the municipality as the difference between the 
logarithm of local residents in 2016 and 2011. According to Grossman et al. (1999), the monitoring 




municipalities’. Hence, there might be scale economies regarding local public services provision. 
In addition, richer local residents usually impose higher pressure for more efficient services,10 we 
therefore include the change in income/wealth measured as the change in the purchasing power 
in 2016 and 2011.  
To control for the change on financial characteristics of the municipality, we include the 
change on spending per capita, measured as the change of the total public expenses per 
inhabitants in 2016 and 2011; the change on financial independence, measured as the change in 
the ratio of own revenues (taxes, sales and other revenues) to total revenues in 2016 and 2011; and 
the change on tax revenues to own revenues ratio in 2016 and 2011. Overreliance on central 
government funds is related to inefficiencies in municipalities (De Borger et al., 1993). The change 
on tax revenues to own revenues ratio is employed to take into account the change on the level of 
municipalities on tax collection. As taxes do not correspond to a specific array of services, contrary 
to revenues from services provisions, municipalities that increase their share could be characterized 
as less successful on providing chargeable services. 
To capture local governments tendency to pursue their self-interests and their political 
agenda (Niskanen, 1975; Migué and Bélanger, 1974), we include three political variables: first, we 
use the Herfindahl index to assess the political concentration in the council of each municipality, 
measured based on the number of seats that different parties have according to the municipal 
elections of 2009 and 2013. A decrease (an increase) in political concentration from 2009 to 2013 
suggests that the concentration of political power is getting weaker (stronger) and the opposition 
party is getting stronger (weaker), which may have a negative efficiency impact. The greater the 
variety of viewpoints the more intense the decision-making process. A stronger political leadership 





may have more power in internal bargain and may find it more likely to resist the pressure to 
accommodate low efficiency and lower outputs (Borge, 2008). We also introduce a dummy 
variable, re-elect, that equals one in cases where the mayor has been re-elected in the last municipal 
elections and zero otherwise. Re-elected mayors for a second-term may be less motivated to 
implement policies towards improving the quantity and quality of services provided to citizens. 
The change on voter turnout is computed as the change in the abstention rate in municipal 
elections. The definition and sources of the explanatory variables are presented in Table B.3 of 
Appendix B.  
The results from Table 7 show that several determinants contribute to explain the efficiency 
scores in the case of the full Mainland sample. The reform itself, taken as binary determinant, 
shows that reducing the number of parishes within a municipality actually contributes to a decrease 
in the input efficiency score (see Column 3 in Table 7). In addition, using the actual changes in the 
number of parishes (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7), the results display an input efficiency reduction 
effect. A 10% reduction on the number of parishes implies a decrease of 0.01 in efficiency. In terms 
of control variables, the increase of population and of government expenditure, diminish efficiency 
as well. In contrast, an increase on own revenues ratio and tax revenues ratio is associated with 
efficiency increases. In terms of political variables, a reduction on voter turnout, increases 
efficiency as well.  
[Table 7] 
Form a regional perspective, we find (see Table 8) that the overall results for the Mainland 
case essentially hold. This is specially the case of Norte region. However, in the Alentejo and 
Algarve region (panel D in Table 8), the reduction in the number of parishes (accounting for control 
variables) does increase the input efficiency scores. This result yet does not hold, when we use a 






Our results are no too different, although less robust, when the analysis is performed in 
terms of output efficiency scores. In addition, we used different estimation methods – Tobit and a 
double bootstrap procedure. These estimation models show similar results as the OLS regressions.  
Additionally, we controlled for several external factors (i.e. tourism index, area, population density, 
automobile fuel consumption, energy consumption, mayor, left and right wing) that might affect 
efficiency. Nonetheless, we removed the non-significant variables and those that presented 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) over 10. All these results available upon on request.  
 
5. Conclusion 
To evaluate if a territorial reform had a positive effect on the change on the efficient scores 
between 2011 and 2016 in Portugal, we used DEA approach. We computed the DEA efficiency 
scores using a composite output indicator of municipal services’ provision, and we use municipal 
expenditure per inhabitant, in 2011 and in 2016 as the input. Afterwards, we assessed through a 
second stage regression whether socio-demographic and economic factors and the reform 
explained the change on efficiency. 
Our results can be summarized as follows: i) overall, there are input and output efficiency 
gains for around 10%  and 6% of municipalities, respectively; ii) regionally, notably in Alentejo 
and in Centro, more than 50% of the municipalities improved efficiency; iii) nevertheless, the 
second stage results show that the territorial reform did not improve local spending efficiency in 
mainland Portugal and particularly in the Norte region; The results are similar for the case of the 




From a policy perspective, it is then less obvious that such reform, which implied a 
reduction of the number of parishes, has enhanced the efficiency of government spending across 
the board for the municipalities. Indeed, efficiency increases only in some regions, and policy 
makers need to account for such specific characteristics. Importantly, reforms like the one 
evaluated in this study require efforts between the central and local governments. Central 
government initiatives for improving local service efficiency and public spending can only be 
effective if local governments are willing participants in those reforms. In fact, local governments 
have to be motivated to implement those reforms on their own because they know more closely the 
needs of their citizens and how to improve the services provided.  
The current study has its limitation. First, there is the issue of selecting inputs and outputs 
to compute the efficiency score and the selection of the control variables for the second-stage 
analysis. Even though the choice relied on the services provided by the local government defined 
in the legal framework, other authors could have chosen different variables, naturally also limited 
to data availability. The same applies to the control variables in the second-stage estimation. 
Finally, this study draws on data from the local government of one country naturally raising 
questions about the generalizability of these findings to another geographic context. While we 
make no claims that our findings are perfectly generalizable to other countries, the theoretical 











Afonso, A., Fernandes, S. (2006). “Measuring local government spending efficiency: Evidence for 
the Lisbon Region”. Regional Studies 40 (1), 39-53. 
Afonso, A., Fernandes, S. (2008). “Assessing and explaining the relative efficiency of local 
government”, Journal of Socio-Economics 37 (5), 1946–1979. 
Afonso, A., Scaglioni, C. (2007). “Efficiency in Italian regional public utilities’ provision”, in 
Servizi Publici: Nuove tendenze nella regolamentazione, nella produzione e nel finanziamento, 
pp. 397-418, eds. M. Marrelli, F. Padovano and I. Rizzo, 2007, Franco Angeli, Milano, Italy. 
Afonso, A., St. Aubyn, M. (2006). “Cross-country Efficiency of Secondary Education Provision: 
a Semi-parametric Analysis with Non-discretionary Inputs”, Economic Modelling, 23 (3), 476-
491.  
Afonso, A., St. Aubyn, M. (2011). “Assessing health efficiency across countries with a two-step 
and bootstrap analysis”, Applied Economics Letters, 18(15), 1427-1430. 
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L., Tanzi, V. (2005). “Public Sector Efficiency: An International 
Comparison”, Public Choice, 123 (3-4), 321-347. 
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L., Tanzi, V. (2010). “Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence for New EU 
Member States and Emerging Markets”, Applied Economics, 42 (17), 2147-2164. 
Athanassopoulos, A., Triantis, K. (1998). “Assessing Aggregate Cost Efficiency and the Related 
Policy Implications for Greek Local Municipalities”, INFOR, 36(3), 66-83. 
Balaguer-Coll, M, Prior-Jimenez, D., Vela-Bargues, J. (2002). “Efficiency and Quality in Local 
Government Management. The Case of Spanish Local Authorities”, Universitat Autonoma de 
Barcelona, WP 2002/2. 
Charnes, A.; Cooper, W., Rhodes, E. (1978). “Measuring the efficiency of decision making units”, 
European Journal of Operational Research, 2, 429–444. 
Coelli T., Rao, D., Battese, G. (2002). An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 6th 
edition, Massachusetts, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
De Borger, B., Kerstens, K., Moesen, W., Vanneste, J. (1994). “Explaining differences in 





De Borger, B., Kerstens, K. (1996). “Cost efficiency of Belgian local governments: A comparative 
analysis of FDH, DEA, and econometric approaches”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
26, 145-170. 
De Borger, B., Kerstens, K. (2000). “What Is Known about Municipal Efficiency?” In Blank, J., 
Lovell, C. and Grosskopf, S. (eds). Public Provision and Performance – contributions from 
efficiency and productivity measurement. Amsterdam, North-Holland, 299-330. 
Dorn, D. (2009). “Essays on Inequality, Spatial Interaction, and the Demand for Skills” 
Dissertation of the University of St. Gallen, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Economics, Law and Social Sciences (HSG). 
Eugène, B. (2008). “The efficiency frontier as a method for gauging the performance of public 
expenditure: a Belgian case study”, National Bank of Belgium, WP 138.  
Farrell, M. (1957). “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency”, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society Series A (General), 120, 253-281. 
Grossman, P., Mavros, P., Wassmer, R. (1999). “Public Sector Technical Inefficiency in Large 
U.S. Cities”, Journal of Urban Economics, 46 (2), 278–299. 
Hamilton, B. (1983). “The Flypaper Effect and Other Anomalies”, Journal of Public Economics, 
22 (3), 347–361. 
Hayes, K., Razzolini, L., Ross, L. (1998). “Bureaucratic Choice and Nonoptimal Provision of 
Public Goods: Theory and Evidence”, Public Choice, 94, 1–20. 
Migué, J., Bélanger, G. (1974). “Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion”, Public 
Choice, 17, 27–43. 
Niskanen, W. (1975). “Bureaucrats and Politicians”, Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (3), 617–
643. 
Prieto, A., Zofio, J. (2001). “Evaluating Effectiveness in Public Provision of Infrastructure and 
Equipment: The Case of Spanish Municipalities“, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 15 (1), 41-
58. 
St. Aubyn, M., Pina, A., Garcia, F., Pais, J. (2009). “Study on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public spending on tertiary education”, Economic Papers 390, European Commission. 
Thanassoulis, E. (2001). Introduction to the Theory and Application of Data Envelopment Analysis. 




Tolbert, C., Killian, M. (1987). “Labor Market Areas for the United States.”Staff Report No. 
AGES870721. Washington, DC: Economic Research Service,US Department of Agriculture. 
Tolbert, C., Size, M. (1996). “U.S. Commuting Zones and Labor Market Areas. A 1990 
Update.”Economic Research Service Staff Paper No. 9614. 
Van den Eeckhaut, P., Tulkens, H., Jamar, M.-A. (1993). “Cost-efficiency in Belgian 
municipalities,” in Fried, H.; Lovell, C. and Schmidt, S. (eds.), The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency: Techniques and Applications. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Worthington, A. (2000). “Cost Efficiency in Australian Local Government: A comparative analysis 
of mathematical programming and econometric approaches”, Financial Accounting and 

























Table 1:  Municipalities socio-demographic and economic characteristics (2011) 
 
 Obs. Average Median St dev Min Max 
Area 278 320 229 284 8 1,721 
Parishes 278 15 11 13 1 89 
Population 278 36,143 15,700 58,222 1,834 547,733 
Population density 278 311 70 864 5 7,389 
Purchase power 278 78 72 21 50 217 
Public spending per capita 278 1,094 932 525 397 3,031 
Percentage of own revenues 278 0.46 0.42 0.19 0.13 0.92 
Tax revenues to own revenues 278 0.39 0.38 0.16 0.05 0.78 
Capital investments to total spending 278 0.26 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.54 
 
 
Table 2:  Some stylized facts for the municipalities  
 
  2011 2016 2016-2011 
Number of parishes 4,050 2,882 -28.84% 
Number of municipalities 278 278 0.00% 
Reduce parishes  230  
Maintain parishes  47  
Increase parishes  1  
    
Resident population 10,047,621 9,809,414 -2.37% 
Reduce parishes 9,481,635 9,250,040 -2.44% 
Maintain parishes 560,521 553,866 -1.19% 
Increase parishes 5,465 5,508 0.79% 
    
Average population per km^2 311 303 -2.52% 
Reduce parishes 341 332 -2.74% 
Maintain parishes 169 169 -0.38% 
Increase parishes 71 65 -7.90% 
    
Average purchasing power 78.0 80.8 3.62% 
Reduce parishes 77.7 80.5 3.62% 
Maintain parishes 79.7 82.5 3.54% 
Increase parishes 78.4 83.3 6.27% 
    
Average spending per capita 1,094 1,055 -3.59% 
Reduce parishes 1,041 1,005 -3.51% 
Maintain parishes 1,351 1,296 -4.00% 
Increase parishes 1,154 1,172 1.59% 
    
Average share of transfers to parishes 2.79% 3.32% 0.53% 
Reduce parishes 3.13% 3.70% 0.58% 
Maintain parishes 1.11% 1.44% 0.32% 
Increase parishes 0.03% 2.67% 2.63% 
Note: The table reports some stylized facts for the local government sector for the years 2011 and 2016 by 
municipalities that reduced, maintained or increased the number of parishes. Column “2016-2011” reports the 




Table 3:  Reform Adoption 
 
  (1) (2) 
   
lPopulation 0.432*** 0.432*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0537) 
Population density -0.0833*** -0.0820*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0287) 
Income -0.00712*** -0.00687*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00199) 
Education -0.0466 -0.0447 
 (0.0442) (0.0499) 
lSpending per capita 0.354** 0.357** 
 (0.139) (0.153) 
Parish transfers  4.483*** 4.187*** 
 (1.418) (1.511) 
Mayor -0.120** -0.119*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0450) 
   
Observations 183 183 
Log pseudolikelihood  -51.41 -51.59 
Pseudo R2  0.496 0.495 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report the marginal coefficients using probit and logit models, respectively. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equalling one if a municipality experienced a reduction in the number 
of parishes. The definition and sources of the independent variables are presented in Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
Districts dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  





Table 4: DEA Efficiency Results 
 










N. of DMUs 
(municipality) 















Alentejo 47 3 (Beja, Elvas, Sines) 6.38% 0.622 0.596 3 (Beja, Santiago do Cacém, Sines) 6.38% 0.655 0.217 
Algarve 16 
4 (Alcoutim, Faro, 
Olhão, Tavira) 
25.00% 0.674 0.628 3 (Alcoutim, Olhão, Tavira) 18.75% 0.611 0.646 
Centro 
78 
4 (Anadia, Vila do 
Rei, Gouveia, Leiria) 
5.13% 0.636 0.603 3 (Vila do Rei, Gouveia, Leiria) 3.85% 0.655 0.629 
LVT 51 
3 (Caldas da 
Rainha,Almada, 
Tomar) 
5.88% 0.674 0.452 
2 (Sintra, Tomar) 
3.92% 0.615 0.386 
Norte 86 
5 (Macedo de 
Cavaleiros, Vila Flor, 
Valongo, Vila Nova 
de Gaia, Alijó) 
5.81% 0.618 0.670 
4 (Barcelos, Macedo de 
Cavaleiros, Vila Flor, Valongo) 
4.65% 0.600 0.666 
Mainland 278 2 (Tomar, Valongo) 0.72% 0.514 0.293 3 (Monchique,Tomar, Valongo) 1.08% 0.425 0.217 
Note: The table reports the DEA efficiency scores using 2011 and 2016 data. The column “Efficient DMUs” reports the number and name of efficient DMUs and 






Table 5: DEA Country Efficiency Scores Comparisons (VRS) 
 
        Input Output 2016-2011 
    DMUs Efficient 
DMUs 
Average Max Min Stdev Average Max Min Stdev Input Output 
1 Country, 2011 DEA 278 2 0.514 1.000 0.185 0.197 0.293 1.000 0.140 0.115     
2 Country, Reduce Parishes  230 1 0.509 1.000 0.185 0.197 0.291 0.922 0.140 0.109   
3 Country, Maintain Parishes 47 1 0.544 1.000 0.198 0.194 0.297 1.000 0.177 0.128   
4 Country, Increase Parishes 1 0 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.000 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.000   
                            
5 Country, 2016 DEA 278 3 0.425 1.000 0.065 0.181 0.217 1.000 0.112 0.093 10.07% 6.12% 
6 Country, Reduce Parishes  230 1 0.416 1.000 0.065 0.177 0.210 0.595 0.112 0.065 10.00% 5.65% 
7 Country, Maintain Parishes 47 2 0.474 1.000 0.213 0.185 0.248 1.000 0.127 0.171 10.64% 8.51% 
8 Country, Increase Parishes 1 0 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.000 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 
Note: The table reports the input and output DEA efficiency scores for the mainland Portugal for the years 2011, Rows (1) to (4), and 2016, Rows (5) to (8). Rows 
(1) and (5) report the scores for the 278 municipalities, Rows (2) and (6) report the scores for the municipalities that reduced the number of parishes, Rows (3) and 
(7) report the scores for the municipalities that maintained the number of parishes, and the remaining rows report the scores for the municipalities that increased the 
number of parishes. The column “Efficient DMUs” reports the number of efficient DMUs and the column “2016-2011” reports the percentage of cases 
(municipalities) where there is a gain in efficiency, by comparing the 2011 efficiency score of the municipalities and the 2016 efficiency score.  









      Input Output 2016-2011 
    DMUs 
Efficient 
DMUs 
Average Max Min Stdev Average Max Min Stdev Input Output 
1 Norte, 2011 DEA 86 5 0.618 1.000 0.215 0.198 0.670 1.000 0.393 0.154     
2 Norte, Reduce Parishes  71 4 0.613 1.000 0.215 0.194 0.664 1.000 0.393 0.151   
3 Norte, Maintain Parishes 15 1 0.643 1.000 0.301 0.215 0.697 1.000 0.426 0.164   
                            
5 Norte 2016 DEA 86 4 0.600 1.000 0.136 0.195 0.666 1.000 0.403 0.151 43.02% 40.70% 
6 Norte, Reduce Parishes  71 2 0.596 1.000 0.136 0.188 0.661 1.000 0.403 0.146 42.25% 40.85% 




      Input Output 2016-2011 
    DMUs 
Efficient 
DMUs 
Average Max Min Stdev Average Max Min Stdev Input Output 
1 Centro 2011 DEA 78 4 0.636 1.000 0.223 0.201 0.603 1.000 0.187 0.172     
2 Centro, Reduce Parishes  63 4 0.636 1.000 0.223 0.210 0.601 1.000 0.187 0.183   
3 Centro, Maintain Parishes 15 0 0.637 0.850 0.267 0.157 0.614 0.862 0.445 0.112   
                            
5 Centro, 2016 DEA 78 3 0.655 1.000 0.175 0.183 0.629 1.000 0.187 0.171 53.85% 56.41% 
6 Centro, Reduce Parishes  63 3 0.646 1.000 0.175 0.192 0.620 1.000 0.187 0.181 52.38% 52.38% 
7 Centro, Maintain Parishes 15 0 0.691 0.917 0.463 0.133 0.667 0.872 0.461 0.116 60.00% 73.33% 
  
 
      Input Output 2016-2011 
    DMUs 
Efficient 
DMUs 
Average Max Min Stdev Average Max Min Stdev Input Output 
1 LVT 2011 DEA 51 3 0.674 1.000 0.343 0.193 0.452 1.000 0.237 0.155     
2 LVT, Reduce Parishes  41 2 0.669 1.000 0.354 0.199 0.444 0.939 0.237 0.145   
3 LVT, Maintain Parishes 10 1 0.693 1.000 0.343 0.165 0.483 1.000 0.263 0.186   
                            
5 LVT, 2016 DEA 51 2 0.615 1.000 0.281 0.170 0.386 1.000 0.195 0.166 39.22% 0.00% 
6 LVT, Reduce Parishes  41 1 0.608 1.000 0.281 0.175 0.377 0.801 0.195 0.150 41.46% 0.00% 








      Input Output 2016-2011 
    DMUs 
Efficient 
DMUs 
Average Max Min Stdev Average Max Min Stdev Input Output 
1 Alentejo, 2011 DEA 47 3 0.622 1.000 0.343 0.166 0.596 1.000 0.279 0.182     
2 Alentejo, Reduce Parishes  41 2 0.619 1.000 0.343 0.156 0.592 1.000 0.279 0.171   
3 Alentejo, Maintain Parishes 6 1 0.642 1.000 0.424 0.224 0.620 1.000 0.334 0.238   
                            
5 Alentejo, 2016 DEA 47 3 0.655 1.000 0.192 0.170 0.530 1.000 0.279 0.171 61.70% 14.89% 
6 Alentejo, Reduce Parishes  41 2 0.650 1.000 0.192 0.168 0.536 1.000 0.279 0.176 63.41% 17.07% 
7 Alentejo, Maintain Parishes 6 1 0.687 1.000 0.556 0.180 0.484 0.592 0.291 0.116 50.00% 0.00% 
 
 
      Input Output 2016-2011 
    DMUs 
Efficient 
DMUs 
Average Max Min Stdev Average Max Min Stdev Input Output 
1 Algarve, 2011 DEA 16 4 0.674 1.000 0.437 0.213 0.628 1.000 0.377 0.201     
2 Algarve, Reduce Parishes  14 3 0.664 1.000 0.437 0.204 0.607 1.000 0.377 0.189   
3 Algarve, Maintain Parishes 1 0 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.000 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.000   
4 Algarve, Increase Parishes 1 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000   
              
5 Algarve, 2016 DEA 16 3 0.611 1.000 0.374 0.243 0.646 1.000 0.367 0.218 6.25% 31.25% 
6 Algarve, Reduce Parishes  14 2 0.599 1.000 0.374 0.230 0.629 1.000 0.367 0.210 7.14% 35.71% 
7 Algarve, Maintain Parishes 1 0 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.000 0.532 0.532 0.532 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 
8 Algarve, Increase Parishes 1 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Note: The tables report the input and output DEA efficiency scores for the Norte, Centro, Lisboa and Vale do Tejo, Alentejo and Algarve 
region for the years 2011, Rows (1) to (4), and 2016, Rows (5) to (8). Rows (1) and (5) report the scores for the total number of municipalities 
within a region, Rows (2) and (6) report the scores for the municipalities that reduced the number of parishes, Rows (3) and (7) report the 
scores for the municipalities that maintained the number of parishes, and the remaining rows report the scores for the municipalities that 
increased the number of parishes. The column “Efficient DMUs” reports the number of efficient DMUs and the column “2016-2011” reports 
the percentage of cases (municipalities) where there is a gain in efficiency, by comparing the 2011 efficiency score of the municipalities and 




Table 7: Regression Model for the Change on Municipality Efficiency Scores 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Change parishes 0.157*** 0.084**   
 (0.032) (0.034)   
Reform   -0.043*** -0.032 
   (0.013) (0.020) 
Coastal  0.009  0.007 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Change population  -0.330**  -0.284* 
  (0.153)  (0.164) 
Change income  0.210  0.246* 
  (0.132)  (0.146) 
Change expenditure  -0.354***  -0.359*** 
  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Change own revenues   0.172**  0.175** 
  (0.085)  (0.085) 
Change tax revenues   0.102**  0.103** 
  (0.044)  (0.047) 
Political concentration  0.015  0.021 
  (0.060)  (0.060) 
Re-elect  0.008  0.008 
  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Change voter turnout   -0.002**  -0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant -0.015 -0.085*** -0.025** -0.079*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
Sigma 0.096*** 0.067*** 0.098*** 0.067*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) 
Log likelihood 255.0 357.4 249.8 356.5 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients for Equation (3) using tobit regression model. The dependent variable is the change in DEA input scores between 
2016 and 2011.  The definition and sources of the independent variables are presented in Table B.3 of Appendix B. Standard errors clustered at the district level are 






Table 8: Regression Results for the Change on Regional Municipality Efficiency Scores 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Norte Region  Panel B: Centro Region 
Change parishes 0.157* -0.039    Change parishes 0.020 0.076   
 (0.087) (0.056)     (0.076) (0.048)   
Reform   -0.008*** -0.044***  Reform   0.016 0.006 
   (0.000) (0.015)     (0.034) (0.022) 
Sigma 0.107*** 0.038*** 0.108*** 0.038***  Sigma 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.106*** 0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)   (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) 
Log likelihood 70.12 159.1 69.08 159.2  Log likelihood 64.67 131.8 64.74 130.0 
     
 
      
Panel C: LVT Region  Panel D: Alentejo e Algarve Regions   
Change parishes 0.125 0.053    Change parishes 0.029 -0.124***   
 (0.092) (0.049)     (0.074) (0.030)   
Reform   0.029 0.020  Reform   -0.017 -0.040*** 
   (0.036) (0.031)     (0.014) (0.010) 
Sigma 0.088*** 0.043*** 0.091*** 0.043***  Sigma 0.104*** 0.042*** 0.104*** 0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004)   (0.015) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) 
Log likelihood 50.58 86.18 49.06 85.81  Log likelihood 53.08 110.3 53.20 109.9 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients for Equation (3) using tobit regression model. The dependent variable is the change in DEA regional input scores 
between 2016 and 2011. Panel A, B, C and D present the coefficients results separately for Norte, Centro, Lisbon and Vale do Tejo and Alentejp and Algarve 
regions, respectively. The number of observations for Panel A, B, C and D equals 86, 78, 50 and 63, respectively. Columns (1) and (3) do not include control 
variables and Columns (2) and (4) add control variables. The definition and sources of the independent variables are presented in Table B.3 of Appendix B. All 
models include district dummies fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** 






Appendix A – 2013 Territorial Reform 
 
 Table A.1: Type of changes  
 







limits Transferred  Eliminated New Total Total 
Abrantes 8 11     19  13 
Águeda 4 16     20  11 
Aguiar da Beira 7 6     13  10 
Alandroal 3 3     6  4 
Albergaria-a-Velha 4 4     8  6 
Albufeira 3 2     5  4 
Alcácer do Sal 3 3     6  4 
Alcanena 5 5     10  7 
Alcobaça 9 9     18  13 
Alcochete 3      3  3 
Alcoutim 3 2     5  4 
Alenquer 6 10     16  11 
Alfândega da Fé 6 14     20  12 
Alijó 10 9     19  14 
Aljezur 4      4  4 
Aljustrel 3 2     5  4 
Almada 1 10     11  5 
Almeida 9 20     29  16 
Almeirim 4      4  4 
Almodôvar 4 4     8  6 
Alpiarça 1      1  1 
Alter do Chão 4      4  4 
Alvaiázere 3 4     7  5 
Alvito 2      2  2 
Amadora   11    11  6 
Amarante 18 22     40  26 
Amares 11 13     24  16 
Anadia 7 8     15  10 
Ansião 5 3     8  6 
Arcos de Valdevez 23 28     51  36 
Arganil 10 8     18  14 
Armamar 10 9     19  14 
Arouca 12 8     20  16 
Arraiolos 3 4     7  5 
Arronches 3      3  3 
Arruda dos Vinhos 4      4  4 
Aveiro 7 7     14  10 
Avis 4 4     8  6 
Azambuja 6 3     9  7 
Baião 8 12     20  14 
Barcelos 43 46     89  61 
Barrancos 1      1  1 
Barreiro 1 7     8  4 











limits Transferred  Eliminated New Total Total 
Beja 6 12     18  12 
Belmonte 3 2     5  4 
Benavente 4      4  4 
Bombarral 3 2     5  4 
Borba 4      4  4 
Boticas 5 11     16  10 
Braga 18 44     62  37 
Bragança 31 18     49  39 
Cabeceiras de Basto 8 9     17  12 
Cadaval 4 6     10  7 
Caldas da Rainha 8 2 6    16  12 
Caminha 9 11     20  14 
Campo Maior 3      3  3 
Cantanhede 9 10     19  14 
Carrazeda de Ansiães 10 9     19  14 
Carregal do Sal 4 3     7  5 
Cartaxo 4 4     8  6 
Cascais 2 4     6  4 
Castanheira de Pêra  2     2  1 
Castelo Branco 13 12     25  19 
Castelo de Paiva 4 5     9  6 
Castelo de Vide 4      4  4 
Castro Daire 11 11     22  16 
Castro Marim 4      4  4 
Castro Verde 3 2     5  4 
Celorico da Beira 12 10     22  16 
Celorico de Basto 10 12     22  15 
Chamusca 3 4     7  5 
Chaves 29 19 3    51  39 
Cinfães 13 4     17  14 
Coimbra 8 23     31  18 
Condeixa-a-Nova 4 6     10  7 
Constância 3      3  3 
Coruche 5 3     8  6 
Covilhã 14 17     31  21 
Crato 3 3     6  4 
Cuba 4      4  4 
Elvas 3 8     11  7 
Entroncamento 2      2  2 
Espinho 3 2     5  4 
Esposende 4 11     15  9 
Estarreja 3 4     7  5 
Estremoz 5 8     13  9 
Évora 6 13     19  12 
Fafe 17 19     36  25 
Faro 2 4     6  4 
Felgueiras 12 20     32  20 
Ferreira do Alentejo 2 4     6  4 
Ferreira do Zêzere 3 2 4    9  7 
Figueira da Foz 7 4 7    18  14 
Figueira de Castelo 












limits Transferred  Eliminated New Total Total 
Figueiró dos Vinhos 3 2     5  4 
Fornos de Algodres 9 7     16  12 
Freixo de Espada à Cinta 2 4     6  4 
Fronteira 3      3  3 
Fundão 18 13     31  23 
Gavião 3 2     5  4 
Góis 3 2     5  4 
Golegã 2   1   3  3 
Gondomar 3 9     12  7 
Gouveia 10 12     22  16 
Grândola 3 2     5  4 
Guarda 33 22     55  43 
Guimarães 31 38     69  48 
Idanha-a-Nova 9 8     17  13 
Ílhavo   4    4  4 
Lagoa 2 4     6  4 
Lagos 2 4     6  4 
Lamego 14 10     24  18 
Leiria 9 20     29  18 
Lisboa  43 10   1 53  24 
Loulé 8 3     11  9 
Loures 4 14     18  10 
Lourinhã 5 6     11  8 
Lousã 2 4     6  4 
Lousada 9 16     25  15 
Mação 5 3     8  6 
Macedo de Cavaleiros 24 14     38  30 
Mafra 6 11     17  11 
Maia 7 10     17  10 
Mangualde 8 10     18  12 
Manteigas 4      4  4 
Marco de Canaveses 6 25     31  16 
Marinha Grande 3      3  3 
Marvão 4      4  4 
Matosinhos  10     10  4 
Mealhada 5 3     8  6 
Mêda 8 8     16  11 
Melgaço 8 10     18  13 
Mértola 6 3     9  7 
Mesão Frio 4 3     7  5 
Mira 4      4  4 
Miranda do Corvo 3 2     5  4 
Miranda do Douro 9 8     17  13 
Mirandela 25 12     37  30 
Mogadouro 17 11     28  21 
Moimenta da Beira 13 7     20  16 
Moita 2 4     6  4 
Monção 17 16     33  24 
Monchique 3      3  3 
Mondim de Basto 4  4    8  6 
Monforte 4      4  4 











limits Transferred  Eliminated New Total Total 
Montemor-o-Novo 5 5     10  7 
Montemor-o-Velho 9 5     14  11 
Montijo 2 6     8  5 
Mora 4      4  4 
Mortágua 6 4     10  7 
Moura 3 5     8  5 
Mourão 3      3  3 
Murça 5 4     9  7 
Murtosa 4      4  4 
Nazaré 3      3  3 
Nelas 5 4     9  7 
Nisa 5 5     10  7 
Óbidos 6 3     9  7 
Odemira 8 6 2  1  17  13 
Odivelas 1 6     7  4 
Oeiras 2 8     10  5 
Oleiros 8 4     12  10 
Olhão 3 2     5  4 
Oliveira de Azeméis 9 10     19  12 
Oliveira de Frades 5 7     12  8 
Oliveira do Bairro 3 3     6  4 
Oliveira do Hospital 11 10     21  16 
Ourém 9 9     18  13 
Ourique 2 4     6  4 
Ovar 4 4     8  5 
Paços de Ferreira 9 7     16  12 
Palmela 3 2     5  4 
Pampilhosa da Serra 6 4     10  8 
Paredes 17 7     24  18 
Paredes de Coura 11 10     21  16 
Pedrógão Grande 3      3  3 
Penacova 5 6     11  8 
Penafiel 23 15     38  28 
Penalva do Castelo 9 4     13  11 
Penamacor 7 5     12  9 
Penedono 5 4     9  7 
Penela 3 3     6  4 
Peniche 3 3     6  4 
Peso da Régua 4 8     12  8 
Pinhel 10 17     27  18 
Pombal 11 6     17  13 
Ponte da Barca 12 13     25  17 
Ponte de Lima 30 21     51  39 
Ponte de Sor 4 3     7  5 
Portalegre 4 6     10  7 
Portel 4 4     8  6 
Portimão 3      3  3 
Porto 4 11     15  7 
Porto de Mós 7 6     13  10 
Póvoa de Lanhoso 16 13     29  22 
Póvoa de Varzim 4 8     12  7 











limits Transferred  Eliminated New Total Total 
Redondo 2      2  2 
Reguengos de Monsaraz 3 2     5  4 
Resende 7 8     15  11 
Ribeira de Pena 3 4     7  5 
Rio Maior 6 8     14  10 
Sabrosa 10 5     15  12 
Sabugal 23 17     40  30 
Salvaterra de Magos 2 4     6  4 
Santa Comba Dão 3 6     9  6 
Santa Maria da Feira 16 15     31  21 
Santa Marta de Penaguião 5 5     10  7 
Santarém 12 15     27  18 
Santiago do Cacém 6 5     11  8 
Santo Tirso 9 15     24  14 
São Brás de Alportel 1      1  1 
São João da Madeira 1      1  1 
São João da Pesqueira 8 6     14  11 
São Pedro do Sul 10 9     19  14 
Sardoal 4      4  4 
Sátão 7 5     12  9 
Seia 14 15     29  21 
Seixal 3 3     6  4 
Sernancelhe 9 8     17  13 
Serpa 3 4     7  5 
Sertã 7 7     14  10 
Sesimbra 3      3  3 
Setúbal 3 5     8  5 
Sever do Vouga 5 4     9  7 
Silves 4 4     8  6 
Sines 2      2  2 
Sintra 4 16     20  11 
Sobral de Monte Agraço 3      3  3 
Soure 8 4     12  10 
Sousel 4      4  4 
Tábua 7 8     15  11 
Tabuaço 9 8     17  13 
Tarouca 4 6     10  7 
Tavira 3 6     9  6 
Terras de Bouro 11 6     17  14 
Tomar 6 10     16  11 
Tondela 12 14     26  19 
Torre de Moncorvo 9 8     17  13 
Torres Novas 6 11     17  10 
Torres Vedras 7 13     20  13 
Trancoso 15 14     29  21 
Trofa 2 6     8  5 
Vagos 5 6     11  8 
Vale de Cambra 6  3    9  7 
Valença 7 9     16  11 
Valongo 3 2     5  4 
Valpaços 20 11     31  25 











limits Transferred  Eliminated New Total Total 
Viana do Alentejo 3      3  3 
Viana do Castelo 19 21     40  27 
Vidigueira 4      4  4 
Vieira do Minho 11 10     21  16 
Vila de Rei 3      3  3 
Vila do Bispo 3 2     5  4 
Vila do Conde 14 16     30  21 
Vila Flor 9 10     19  14 
Vila Franca de Xira 2 9     11  6 
Vila Nova da Barquinha 3 2     5  4 
Vila Nova de Cerveira 7 8     15  11 
Vila Nova de Famalicão 23 26     49  34 
Vila Nova de Foz Côa 12 5     17  14 
Vila Nova de Gaia 8 16     24  15 
Vila Nova de Paiva 4 3     7  5 
Vila Nova de Poiares 4      4  4 
Vila Pouca de Aguiar 12 6     18  14 
Vila Real 12 18     30  20 
Vila Real de Santo 
António 3      3 
 3 
Vila Velha de Ródão 4      4  4 
Vila Verde 21 37     58  33 
Vila Viçosa 3 2     5  4 
Vimioso 7 7     14  10 
Vinhais 18 17     35  26 
Viseu 18 16     34  25 
Vizela 3 4     7  5 
Vouzela 6 6         12  9 























Appendix B – Variable definitions and sources 
 
Table B.1: Definition of the Variables and Respective Sources for reform adoption 
Variable Definition Source 
Population Logarithm of the local inhabitants, 2011 
INE 2011, Recenseamento da 
População e Habitação, 2011 
Population density Logarithm of population per km^2, 2011  
INE 2011, Recenseamento da 
População e Habitação, 2011 
Income Purchasing power, 2011. Purchasing power is an index 
constructed by the Statistics Portugal to evaluate the income 
and wealth of local residents. 
INE, Estudo sobre o Poder de 
Compra Concelho 2011  
Education Share of educated residents, 2011. Educated residents are 
individuals with high school diploma, bachelor, masters or 
doctoral degrees. 
INE 2011,  
Spending per 
capita 
Logarithm of the spending per local inhabitants, 2011  Direcção-Geral das Autarquias 
Locais, Despesas municipais do 




Parish transfers Share of local spending allocated to parishes,2011 
Mayor Dummy variable equaling one if a mayor is from the same 
political party as the government. 








Table B.2 – Definition of the Input (X) and Output Variables (Y) and Respective Sources 
 
Variable Input measure Source 
X Total municipal expenditures per 
inhabitant, 2011 and 2016 
Direcção-Geral das Autarquias Locais, 
Despesas municipais do ano de 2011 e 





measures Municipal results indicators Source 
  Social services Percentage of local inhabitants with ≥65 
years old 2011 and 2016 
INE 2012 and 2017, Statistical Yearbook 
of Alentejo, Algarve, Centro, Lisboa and 
Norte Regions 2011 and 2016;  
INE. 
  Basic education School buildings per capita measured by 
the number of nursery and primary 
school buildings in percent of the total 
number of corresponding school-age 
inhabitants ( ), 2011 and 2016. 
 
Gross primary enrolment ratio, the 
number of enrolled students in nursery 
and primary education in percent of the 
total number of corresponding school-
age inhabitants ( ), 2001 and 2016. 
INE 2012 and 2017, Statistical Yearbook 
of Alentejo, Algarve, Centro, Lisboa and 
Norte Regions 2011 and 2016;  
INE. 
 ! Cultural 
services 
Number of museums, zoos, botanical 
gardens and aquariums per capita ( !), 
2011 and 2016 
 
Number of art facilities per capita ( !), 
2011 and 2016 
INE 2012 and 2017, Statistical Yearbook 
of Alentejo, Algarve, Centro, Lisboa and 
Norte Regions 2011 and 2016;  
INE. 
 " Sanitation Water supply per capita  ( "), 2011 and 
2016  
 
Urban waste collection per capita ( "), 
2011 and 2016 
INE 2012 and 2017, Statistical Yearbook 
of Alentejo, Algarve, Centro, Lisboa and 
Norte Regions 2011 and 2016;  
INE. 
 # Territory 
organization 
Building permits issued by local 
administration per capita, 2011 and 2016 
INE 2012 and 2017, Statistical Yearbook 
of Alentejo, Algarve, Centro, Lisboa and 







Table B.3 – Definition of the Variables and Respective Sources for Second- Stage 
Regression 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Change parish 
Difference between  the logarithm of the number of parishes in 2016 
and 2011 within a municipality 
Lei n.º 11-A/2013, de 28 de 
janeiro, Reorganização 
Administrativa do Território das 
Freguesias; Declaração de 
Retificação n.º 19/2013, de 28 de 
março; Lei n.º 56/2012, de 8 de 
novembro - Reorganização 
Administrativa de Lisboa 
Direção Geral de Administração 
Interna (DGAI) 
Reform 
Dummy variable that equals one if a municipality reduced the number 
of parishes between 2016 and 2011, and zero otherwise 
Coastal 
Dummy variable that equals one when the municipality is located near 
the sea, and zero otherwise. 
 
Change population Difference between the logarithm of local residents in 2016 and 2011 INE 
Change income 
Difference between the purchasing power in 2016 and 2011. 
Purchasing power is an index constructed by the Statistics Portugal to 
evaluate the income and wealth of local residents. 
INE, Estudo sobre o Poder de 
Compra Concelho 2011 and 2016 
Change 
expenditure 
Difference between the logarithm of the spending per local 
inhabitants in 2016 and 2011, 
Direcção-Geral das Autarquias 
Locais, Despesas municipais do 
ano de 2011 e 2016 com trimestres 
e anual 
(http://www.portalautarquico.dgal.




Difference between the ratio of own revenues (taxes, sales and other 
revenues) to total revenues in 2016 and 2011. 
Change tax 
revenues 
Difference between the ratio of tax revenues to own revenues (taxes, 
sales and other revenues) in 2016 and 2011. 
Political 
concentration 
Difference on the Herfindahl index, measured on the basis of the 
number of seats that different parties have according to the municipal 
elections of 2009 and 2013 
Results of municipal elections  11-




Dummy variable that equals one in cases where the mayor has been 
re-elected in the last municipal elections and zero otherwise 
Change voter 
turnout 
Difference between the abstention rate in municipal elections of 2009 
and 2013 
 
